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Religion, Politics, and Feminist
Epistemology: A Comment on the Uses and
Abuses of Morality in Public Discourse
SUSAN H. WUiAMS"

In the United States in recent years, we have been experiencing a lively debate, in
both the popular and academic press, about the role of religion in our public, political
life.' The terms of this debate sometimes suggest that while morality in general is
acceptable, even desirable, as part of our political culture, religious morality raises
particular problems that make it suspect in unique ways. 2 By reading the articles for
this panel through the lens of feminist epistemology, I will suggest that both parts of
this common assumption are mistaken. The use of contested moral frameworks in our
political life is, I will argue, simply inescapable, but it is by no means unproblematic.
And religious frameworks are not inherently more or less acceptable than other sorts.
The distinction we should be worrying about is not the religious/nonreligious
distinction, but rather the difference between moral frameworks that encourage their
adherents to adopt a stance of vulnerability to challenge and those that seek to
insulate their adherents from such vulnerability. Religions fall on both sides of this
line.

The articles for this panel address the role of religion in particular, and morality
more generally, from a variety of perspectives. From the perspective of a lawyer,
Professor Dan Conkle succinctly outlines the several different ways in which
religious discourse enters politics and offers a balanced assessment of the
constitutionality and the wisdom of these different uses.3 In particular, he suggests
that the use of religious institutions to deliver publicly funded social services-as in
President Bush's recent faith-based initiative-maydo religion more harm than good

* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
I. For examples from the popularpress, see RELIGIONANDAMERICANPOLICS: THE2000
ELEcTON INCONTEXT (Mark Silk ed., 2000); Rob Boston, Preachers,Politics,andCampaign
2000, CHURCH & ST., Sept. 1, 2000, at 14; Jonathan Kirsch, Urginga More Civil Approach

to Debate Over Church-State Separation, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 2001, at B20 (reviewing
RELIGION INAMERICANPUBLiC LIFE: LIVING WITH OUR DEEPEST DIFFERENCES (Azizah Y. alHibri et al. eds., 2001)). For examples from the academic literature, see MICHAEL J. PERRY,
LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991);
RELIGION INAMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE: LIVNG WITH OUR DEEPEST DIFFERENCES (Azizah

Y. al-

Hibri et al. eds., 2001); Symposium, ReligiouslyBasedMorality: ItsProperPlacein American
Law and Public Policy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 401 (2001); Mark W. Cordes, Politics,
Religion, and the FirstAmendment, 50 DEPAULL. REV. 111 (2000); Michael J.Perry, Liberal

Democracyand Religious Morality, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1998); Suzanna Sherry, Religion
and the PublicSquare:Making DemocracySafefor Religious Minorities,47 DEPAULL. REV.

499 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Tillich and Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
954, 968, 980-83 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF
RELIGION AND MORALITY INAMERICAN POLITICS (199 1)).
3. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Religion, Politics, and the 2000 PresidentialElection: A
Selective Survey and Tentative Appraisal,77 IND. L.J. 247 (2002).
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if itbecomes widespread.4 He also sounds a note of concern about the use of religious
claims of spiritual meaning in a political context, at least where those claims are
explicitly sectarian.5 But he argues that religious discourse is appropriate in a broad
range of political settings, from the assessment of a candidate's moral character, to
the recognition of religion as a basis for our political ideals and institutions.6
Professor Jeff Isaac7 focuses his attention on the public funding of religious
institutions as a means of delivering social services.8 From theperspective ofpolitical
theory, he suggests that programs like the President's must be seen in the larger
context of debates about the role of civil society.9 Through that lens, he forcefully
argues, the program is revealed to have many of the strengths and weaknesses
associated with civil society approaches generally. In particular, such approaches are
valuable in their demand that solutions to social problems be formulated at the lowest
feasible level-the principle of subsidiarity. ° They are useful in mobilizing and
creating social capital; and they possess the pragmatic virtue of being able to work
within the constraints of a political world in which antistate sentiment is strong and
the will to remedy social problems is -weak." The limitations of civil society

4.
5.
6.
7.

See id. at 250-52.
See id. at 263-64.
See id at 256, 259-60.
Professor Issac presented his article at this Symposium, but is publishing elsewhere.
8. Jeffrey C. Isaac, Faith-Based Initiatives: A Civil Society Approach, GOOD SOC'Y
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 4, on file with the IndianaLaw Journal).Professor Isaac
states that "[tlhe Bush policies are designed to use the government-federal, state, and
local[-]to assist voluntary efforts to deliver social assistance, to attack neighborhood and
community problems, and to build community assets." Id. "[D]oes the faith-based initiative
idea hold out any promise of enhancing social service delivery or distributive justice or the
practice of engaged and responsible citizenship? My answer...is a qualified 'yes."' Id. at 3.
9. See id. at 2-3. Professor Isaac notes:
[T]he faith-based initiative idea is deeply ideological, but in a complex rather
than a simple way. While it does seek to bring faith into the public realm in a
visible way-long a goal of the Religious Right-it is not reducible to a tactic
of the Religious Right. While it poses some important Constitutional
questions, and while it will be necessary for some of these questions to be
worked out inthe courts, it is not primarily about the public establishment of
religion. Furthermore, while it embodies anti-statist prejudices that should
make liberals and those farther to the left blanch, the faith-based initiative idea
should not be lightly dismissed, for it represents in some ways a promising
,$civil society" approach to public policy in a post-liberal, post-welfare state
political movement.
Id.
10. See id. at 16. Professor Isaac argues that
[The faith-based initiative] represents a way to tap and to leverage the moral
resources present in the institutions and associations of civil society; it
represents a way to link the delivery of social services with a civic rather than
a bureaucratic approach; it works on the principle of subsidiarity, which
locates solutions at the lowest level possible....
Id.
11. See id. at 16 (arguing that "as a matter ofpragmatics [the faith-based initiative concept]
reflects where public discourse currently is, and [also] the low level of mobilized public
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approaches generally, and the faith-based initiative in particular, include their
uncritical acceptance of presently existing civil society institutions; their too easy
abandonment of larger scale solutions even when they may be necessary; and their
panglossian refusal to recognize the issues of political conflict andjustice that attend
the implementation of any such program. 2
Fromtheperspective ofliterairy and cultural studies, ProfessorKathleen Woodward
explores the rhetoric of compassion-in its liberal, academic, and conservative
forms. 3 She points out that issues of difference and hierarchy, which are central to
the liberal vision, are excised from the conservative discourse." This elimination is
accomplished by disconnecting compassion from the suffering of actual individuals
and transforming it into a description of social policies and political ideologies:
"compassionate conservatism."' 5 She criticizes this "morally empty appropriation"
as having lost the connection to feeling and the transformative aspect at the heart of
compassion."
Whatever their differences on particular issues of policy, the panelists all seem to
be in agreement on one fundamental fact: as Isaac puts it, politics is about values."
Values, in turn, are the expression of cultural systems of meaning. That is to say,
values make sense only within some framework that defines a way of life in which
the values could have worth. 8 Some of those frameworks or systems are usefully

support for more ambitious remedial public policies that currently exists").
12. See id. at 3-4 (stating that his qualified support for faith-based initiatives places him
at "odds with the [p]anglossian attitude often evinced by conservative and religious supporters
of the idea").
13. See Kathleen Woodward, CalculatingCompassion,77 IND. L.J 223 (2002).
14. See id. at 236-37.
15. See id. at237.
16. See id. at 225.
17. See Isaac,supranote 8. Professor Isaac suggests that the political debate over the faithbased initiative is largely a debate over the values served by such programs in American
society:
The prominence accorded the faith-based idea has brought to the fore
important questions about the meaning of citizenship and civic responsibility
and about the role of the state in a democratic society. Critics of the Bush
administration should not shy away from such a discussion. They should treat
the promotion ofthe faith-based idea as an opportunity to raise hard questions
about community, democracy, and the true meaning ofcitizenship, and to press
this discussion in a more egalitarian, democratic, and visionary direction.
Id. at 26.
18. See ALASDAIRMACINTYRE, AFTER ViRTUE: A STUDY INMORALTHEoRY 186 (2d ed.
1984) ("One of the features of the concept of a virtue which has emerged with some clarity
from the argument so far is that it always requires for its application the acceptance of some
prior account of certain features of social and moral life in terms of which it has to be defined
and explained.").
To claim that values make sense onlywithin amoral framework is not to deny the possibility
of cross-cultural dialogue about or even criticism of values. In other words, this is not simple
cultural relativism. It is to suggest, however, that we misunderstand the task before us if we
believe that we can engage in such dialogue or criticism without achieving some understanding
of the moral frameworks in which the values we wish to discuss are embedded. See generally
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categorized as religions, and some are not. There are two crucial facts about our
political life when it is understood as a conversation and contest about values. First,
we do not all inhabit the same cultural systems of meaning and do not all share the
same values. Indeed, as Woodward suggests, our differences maybe ineradicable. 9
Second, the contests and conversations about values in which we engage are
themselves the sites of contestedvalues, such as the multiple meanings of democracy.
In other words, we need procedures for struggling over our different value choices,
but we need to recognize that what the procedures are is itself a subject over which
those with different values will struggle.2"

In light of this, I think that one useful lens for viewing the relationship between
religion and politics is the lens of epistemology. In ourpolitical struggles over values,
we must decide how we can effectively understand each other across our differences
and what role religious claims play in this process. Feminist epistemology may be
particularly useful here because it has focused its attention on the ways in which
contests over truth and reality are played out in situations of hierarchy.2 Feminist
epistemologists have been searching for a way to understand our conversations about
truth that is consistent with the recognition that all truth claims rely upon value
choices and that we do not share the same values nor even the same cultural
categories in which to understand our values. They have looked for the characteristics
of conversations where illegitimate hierarchies are not used to silence any of the
participants and where fruitful dialogue across difference is possible.' And they have
looked for this not only in abstract, theoretical conversation, but in the particular
cultural and institutional contexts in which we find ourselves.' In that sense, the
feminist project has been very pragmatist.24
I will offer a few of the insights of feminist epistemologists and then try to apply
them to some of the concerns raised by the panelists. One of the most important
aspects of the feminist critique of mainstream epistemology is the argument that
different forms of knowledge claims include moral foundations or implications and
that the knowledge claims can be criticized on the basis of their morality. Knowledge
claims rest on value judgments at several stages: first, at the stage of defining what
is worth studying; second, at the stage of deciding what will count as the evidence to
be considered; and third, at the stage of interpreting and theorizing about that

CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989).

19. See Woodward, supra note 13, at 230.
20. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POUTICS OF DIFFERENCE 201 (1990).
21. See, e.g., Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is "Strong
Objectivity"?, in FEMINIST EpISTEMOLOGIEs 49-50 (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds.,

1993).
22. See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY, AND

POSTMODERNISM INCONTEMPORARY EThics 6-12 (1992).
23. See, e.g., Mary M. Gergen, Toward a Feminist Metatheory andMethodology in the
SocialSciences,in FEMINISTTHOUGHTAND THE STRUCTUREOFKNOWI.EDGE 87,87-101 (Mary
M. Gergen ed., 1988).
24. For discussions of the relationship between pragmatism and feminism, see Margaret
J. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1699 (1990); Phyllis Rooney,
Feminist-PragmatistRevisionings of Reason, Knowledge, and Philosophy, 8 HYPATIA 15
(1993).
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evidence.2 s Moreover, an epistemological position as a whole may represent a stance
with important moral aspects. For example, Cartesian models of knowledge as power
over an object can be criticized on the basis of the immorality of objectification and
the devaluation of the interaction between subject and object inherent in this
epistemology.26 The idea is thatknowledge claims include a moral stance and that the
proponent of such claims must accept responsibility for the moral stance implicit in
her position.
Accepting responsibility is itself a moral stance. 7 Indeed, this moral stance
becomes the only possible ground for objectivity in an epistemology that has
abandoned the idea thatknowledge consists of accurate representations ofan external
reality.28 It is the adoption of such a stance, and the fulfillment of the attendant
responsibility with integrity, that is the only basis for trust between people operating
within different moral and epistemological frameworks.29 In other words, since we
do not share the same frameworks, we can construct a shared reality only upon the
basis of trust in such a moral stance. Only if I believe that you will stay in this
relation with me and fulfill this responsibility can I trust you in the way that is
necessary to reach beyond our differing frameworks to construct a shared reality on
which democratic action can be based.
The precise nature of the moral stance required may well differ in different social
contexts, but perhaps we could say something about what might be required of
interlocutors in our national political discourse. To begin with, we must acknowledge

the moral foundations and implications of our truth claims. I think, in some respects,
those who are bringing religious language and perspectives to bear on political issues
are the most likely to meet this responsibility. They may be less prone to the pretense
of neutrality that infects so many nonreligious discourses. For example, people
applying scientific or economic models to resolve social issues often claim that they
are not relying upon moral frameworks at all, but in fact, the assumptions inherent in
their disciplinary models involve significant, and contested, moral claims." Because
those relying explicitly upon religion are more aware of the contested nature of their
values, they are less likely to assume or insist that their views are somehow neutral

25. For discussion of the impact of value judgments on knowledge formation, see Sandra
Harding, Is ThereaFeministMethod?,in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 1, 6 (Sandra Harding
ed., 1987); Ruth Hubbard, Some Thoughts About the Masculinity ofthe NaturalSciences, in
FEMINIST THOUGHT AND THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23, at 1; Naomi
Schemann, Individualismandthe Objects ofPsychology, in DISCOVERINGREAUTY: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS 225,229 (Sandra Harding &Merrill B.
Hintikka eds., 1983).
26. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 97

(1989).
27. See generally LORRAINE CODE, EPISTEMIC REspONSEBILITY (1987).
28. For versions of such approaches to objectivity, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880-81 (1990); Harding, supra note 21, at 52.
29. See Susan H. Williams, Truth,Speech, andEthics:A FeministRevision ofFreeSpeech
Theory, 30 GENDERS (Nov. 1999), at http://www.genders.orglg3O/g30_williams.html.
30. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815,
826-35 (1990); Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1985).
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or universally acknowledged. Indeed, the feminist position here may be seen as a
perhaps surprising endorsement of the claim that reliance on religious values does not
distinguish these political actors from others because we are all relying on contested
values.
But the feminist approach requires more than simply the realization that our values
are implicated. The feminist approach suggests that in order to reach across our
differences to construct a shared reality on which policy choices can be based, we
must be willing to have our values challenged and we must be actively engaged in
exploring the frameworks of those who are different. In other words, the
responsibility here includes a powerful dose of vulnerability and an openness to
challenge.3' Most fundamentally, we have a responsibility to listen to, perhaps even
to seek out, moral perspectives that differ from our own and to engage with them in
a spirit of openness that leaves us vulnerable to their challenge.
This vulnerability is particularly important because the relationships ofpower and
hierarchy that infect our national political discourse mean that the ability to help
shape our shared reality is not equally distributed. I suspect that this sort of
vulnerability would be crucial even if we lived in a world with substantial equality,
but of course we do not. In our world of dramatic and cross-cutting hierarchies, there
are many with a limited ability to affect the reality we share, and there are a few who
are so insulated by wealth, race, gender and so on that they need never notice that
their perspective is not shared by the many others whose lives they affect.32 Thus, the
responsibility to be vulnerable and open is not merely a responsibility to
oneself-necessary to the achievement of any objectivity-but also a responsibility
to those others in one's political community who might seek to challenge one in this
way. This responsibility is, in other words, a basic democratic obligation.
Now, it is not the case that religious views of truth are necessarily inconsistent with
this stance. Indeed, for many religious believers, such openness and responsibility to
others is a central aspect of their understanding of their faith.3 It would be salutary
for the liberal critics of religion-in-politics to rememberthat, for much of our history,
religion has been one of the primary social forces pressing for greater openness and
vulnerability.34 Some religious views of truth may, however, be in tension with the
need for vulnerability and openness I am describing, and many other, nonreligious
views of truth are also in tension with this stance. What the feminist perspective
demonstrates, I believe, is that the focus on religion in particular is misplaced: it is
not religion that is the issue, but all frameworks that seek to insulate their believers
from such challenge and to provide them with a type 6f securitythat is fundamentally

31. See Williams, supra note 29.
32. On the privilege that comes with a high position in a hierarchy, see STEPHANIE M.
WILDMAN ET AL, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA
(1996); Stephanie M. Wildman &Adrienne D. Davis, LanguageandSilence: Making Systems
ofPrivilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881 (1995); Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the
Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, CREATION SPIRITUALITY, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 33.
33. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, The Death ofGod in American Pragmatismand Realism:
Resurrectingthe Value ofLove in ContemporaryJurisprudence,82 GEO. L. J. 1431, 1480-83
(1994).
34. ROBERTN. BELLAH ET AL, HABITS OFTHE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT
INAMERICAN LIFE 248-49 (updated ed. 1996).
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inconsistent with their democratic and epistemological obligations. Some of those
frameworks are religions, and some are not. Some religious beliefs are conducive to
democratic responsibility, and some are not The attention to the role of religion in
public life is, from this perspective, a distraction from the more pressing issue that we
face: how do we encourage people operating within all sorts of frameworks, religious
and otherwise, to become self-conscious about the values they bring to public
discourse and open to challenges-empathic challenges and other sorts-particularly
those challenges they otherwise have the power to avoid?
In the context of the particular issues considered by the panelists, I think this
epistemological perspective suggests a few possibilities. First, with respect to the
faith-based funding initiative: if public money is given to private organizations, part
of whose mission is the promotion of a particular moral framework, we must be sure
that the public money is not facilitating a refusal of this democratic responsibility. I
agree with Isaac that one such approach would be to consider making such funds
available to organizations whose service is to raise the voices that might otherwise
fail tobeheard in these programs." I also think that the organizations receiving funds
might be required as a condition of those funds to provide structures that open them
to challenge by the constituencies they serve. Such structures might include governing
boards for the programs that are required to include representatives of the groups
served; mechanisms for direct (including anonymous) feedback from the recipients
of services; and regular opportunities for those served to confront personally and
face-to-face the people serving them in order to challenge the moral framework the
service providers are seeking to promote.
In relation to religious discourse in the public, political realm, I agree with Conlde
that it is in no sense presumptively illegitimate. To begin with the legal issues, the use
of religiously based values in political discourse, or even in legislation, does not
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Legislation about certain
matters conventionally understood as religious could violate the Constitution, but
legislation on clearly secular matters that is shaped by religiously motivated morality
generally does not.3 6 The issue on which I would like to focus is not a legal one, but

35. See Isaac, supra note 8, at 21. Professor Isaac argues that "support should not be
limited to charitable or service groups, but also to advocacygroupswhen these groups can be
shown to deliver services or to perform legitimate functions." Id. (emphasis in original) Just
as groups "should not be discriminated against on account of the religious motivations that
energize them[,]...[t]he same principle must thus apply to more left or activist groups. They
should not be discriminated against on account of the ideological agendas that motivate and
energize their work." Id.
36. Unless the purpose, or even the "primary" purpose, is to promote that religion. See
Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose,Inerrancy,and the Establishment Clause,67 IND. L. J.
1, 3-7 (1991). In his article, Professor Conkle offers a distinction between errant and inerrant
religious beliefs that is closely related, in both concept and spirit, to the distinction I am
seeking to make in this Article. There are a few differences between our approaches that are
worth mentioning, however. First, Professor Conkle intends his distinction to function as part
of the legal doctrine under the Establishment Clause, while I intend mine to be the basis for
moral and political criticism, but not for differences in legal treatment. Second, my concept of
insulated religious beliefs is, perhaps, more substantive than Professor Conkle's. I see certain
substantive views-such as those described in the next paragraph of the text infra-as
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a moral and political one. For while the use of such religiously based morality in

politics may not be unconstitutional, it may nonetheless be illegitimate and worthy of
public censure.
An effort to shape public policy in accord with one's own framework, religious or
otherwise, ought to be accompanied by a willingness to subject that framework to
challenge. A framework is therefore legitimately criticized-whether religious or
not-if it operates in such a way as to insulate its believers from such challenge. Such
insulation can take many forms. First, it could take the form of denying to opponents
the basic respect on which any actual dialogue is premised." As Seyla Benhabib puts
it: "[a]ll argumentation entails respect for one's conversation partners; such respect
belongs to the idea of fair argumentation; to be a competent partner in such
conversation entails recognizing the principle of equal respect."38 Without a
recognition of the equal personhood of those who might challenge one's vieWs, there
is no realistic possibility that such a challenge could be met with openness. As a
result, extreme racist, sexist, and homophobic views-whether based on religion or
not-which deny such equal personhood to others are properly criticized as an
illegitimate basis for public policy. My point here is not the common One that such
attitudes are inconsistent with the basic assumptions of democracy. Rather, I am
arguing that such attitudes are inconsistent with the fundamental responsibility to
adopt a stance of vulnerability that is required for interlocutors in a post-Cartesian
world. 9 In other words, the objection here is epistemological, as well as moral and
political: these attitudes toward others make it impossible for us to attain the only
kind of truth that is possible for us.'
A second form of insulation involves a kind of reliance on authority that makes it
impossible for someone outside of the framework to challenge the framework. I do
not mean to be pointing here to the fact that religious frameworks are based on faith;
all ultimate commitments-whether understood as religious ornot-maybe based on
faith. Instead, I am suggesting that some such commitments allow those who do not
share them the authority necessary to challenge them, while others restrict such
authority to believers, or even to a subset of privileged believers. Thus, one could be

providing a freedom from challenge regardless of whether they are technically held as inerrant
in Professor Conkle's sense. Finally, Professor Conkle draws the justification for his distinction
from a particular model of democracy implicit in the Constitution, whereas my justification is
epistemological and concerns the conditions under which the search for truth is possible.
37. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Kibitzers,Fuzzies, andApes Without Tails:Pragmatismand
the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL L. REV. 69, 110 (1991); Susan H. Williams
& David C. Williams, A Feminist Theory ofMalebashing,4 MICH. J. GENDER &L. 35, 81-97
(1996).
38. SEYLABENHABIB, SITUATINGTHE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY, AND POSTMODERNISM
INCONTEMPORARY ETHICS 31 (1992).
39. Cartesianism is the name often given to the mainstream tradition in Western
epistemology, holding that human knowledge is a representation of an objective and external
reality that is universally true for all people. See Alison M. Jagger & Susan R. Bordo,
Introduction, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BEING AND
KNOWING 1, 3 (1989); Jane Flax, Postmodernismand GenderRelationsin Feminist Theory,
in FEMINIsMIPosTMODERNisM 39,41-42 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
40. See Williams, supra note 29.
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committed to a religious framework in which the meaning of moral precepts is and
must be set only by a limited class of authorities within that religion-perhaps
because only those persons receive direct communication from God-and thus no one
outside couldpossiblyoffer an interpretation that could challenge that meaning. Such
a framework can be legitimately criticized as inappropriate as a basis forpublic policy
because it seeks to insulate itself from challenge by others who inhabit the shared
political realm.4'
Nonreligious frameworks can operate in a similar way. Certain forms of reliance
on science to solve public policy questions may lead to a form of insulation if they
effectively reject the possibility that those outside the scientific establishment couldchallenge the moral framework inherent in the scientific approach. Many, perhaps
most, appeals to science do not explicitly require that outsiders are disqualified from
challenging them, but they may often be used in practice to achieve that effect.42 If
such scientific frameworks are proposed as a basis for public policy, then their
proponents must realize that they have an obligation to be open-in practice, and not
just in theory-to challenge by those with alternative moral views.43
And with respect to the discourse of compassionate conservatism, I agree with
Woodward that it is merely the shell of compassion. Attention to the underlying
epistemological/political vulnerability that is the necessary moral stance helps to
explain why the aspects Woodward identifies as missing are missing. The empathy,
or compassion, that Woodward explores is one result of this stance of vulnerability.
That is, it is this morallepistemologicallpolitical position that allows for the
experience of empathy. One must be open to the challenge posed by a different
experience, willing to enter into it even at the cost of some pain, in order to
experience empathy." One must, in other words, be vulnerable. Without that
vulnerability, empathy-along with a variety of other responses to different
others-is impossible. Thus, the experience of compassion rests on a particular
epistemological foundation: a vulnerability to challenge. If that foundational
vulnerability is absent from this form of conservatism, then it is no wonder that it is
incapable of actual compassion. As Woodward's analysis suggests, then, the issue
here is not religion versus nonreligion; it is instead, real compassion versus a mere
simulacrum, or more generally, real vulnerability versus the illusion of an insular
security. The focus on religion in our public debate is a distraction that pulls our
attention away from understanding and achieving the sort of responsibility that we
need.
Our epistemological state, then, is parallel to our political state: we are always
vulnerable and there are no guarantees that we can rely upon to make our safety
certain. This is, of course, an intensely uncomfortable position and one that people
understandably attempt to flee-thus the many frameworks, religious and otherwise,

41. This second sense is closest to Professor Conkle's idea ofinerrancy. See Conkle,supra
note 36, at 10-11.
42. For a description and critique of this process, see Ruth Hubbard, Science, Facts, and
Feminism, in FEMINISM AND SCIENCE 119, 125-30 (Nancy Tuana ed., 1989).
43. I also differ from Professor Conkle on this issue of extending the distinction to
nonreligious views as well. See Conkle, supra note 36, at 23.
44. See Lynne N. Henderson, LegalityandEmpathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1583 (1987).
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that we have devised to provide ourselves with a reason why we need not accept this
vulnerability, why we can turn away from it and deny it. But the lesson that politics
is about values, like the lesson that truth is also about values, teaches us that our most
basic obligation-political as well as epistemological-is to accept our vulnerability.
The security and certainty that we seek so desperately is itself antithetical to the
dream of a pluralist democracy. We must accept our vulnerability, indeed, we must
expand that vulnerability in ways that make us open to challenge fromthose we could
otherwise choose to ignore. Only then will we fulfill the moral responsibility which
is the only foundation on which our claims to truth and democratic legitimacy can
rest.

